Such functions might well be important to higher pleasures as well as meaningful aspects of happiness. Although highly speculative, we wonder whether the default network might deserve further consideration for a role in connecting eudaimonic and hedonic happiness. At least, key regions of the frontal default network overlap with the hedonic network discussed above, such as the anterior cingulate and orbitofrontal cortices Beckmann et al.
Eudaimonic wellbeing may be correlated with activity in the anterior cingulate and in left prefrontal cortex, perhaps though the ability to suppress negative emotions Urry et al. Activity changes in the frontal default network, such as in the subgenual cingulate and orbitofrontal cortices, correlate to pathological changes in subjective hedonic experience, such as in depressed patients Davidson et al.
Pathological self-representations by the frontal default network could also provide a potential link between hedonic distortions of happiness that are accompanied by eudaimonic dissatisfaction, such as in cognitive rumination of depression Addis et al. Conversely, mindfulness-based cognitive therapy for depression, which aims to disengage from dysphoria-activated depressogenic thinking might conceivably recruit default network circuitry to help mediate improvement in happiness via a linkage to hedonic circuitry Teasdale et al.
Beyond the default network, other cortical networks have been proposed to correspond by direct activation with eudaimonic evaluations of self, relation to others, and with meaningful themes related to life satisfaction Heller et al. These include dorsolateral prefrontal, and other parietal and temporal cortex networks. In short, the default network and lateral cortical networks whose activation encodes evaluations of self and life meaning stand among the brain candidates for a substrate that might mediate eudaimonic appraisals.
How these networks actually embody eudaimonia components, and how they link evaluations of life meaningfulness and satisfaction with pleasurable states of hedonia, remains a major puzzle for psychological neuroscience to unravel in the future. While some progress has been made in understanding brain hedonics, it is important not to over-interpret.
We do not yet have a neuroscience of happiness. We have merely aimed to sketch out the beginnings of a hedonic approach that may prove fruitful. Further, when all is done, one may still question our entire effort, based as it is largely on evidence from sensory pleasures.
Some will demur that pleasure, our chief focus here, is irrelevant after all to true happiness. For many, this view might be well expressed by the words of John Stuart Mill, "It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.
By the view expressed in this quotation, a life filled with the most intense pleasures of pigs or fools would never be enough for happiness because true happiness hinges on a superior kind of psychological or eudaimonic richness that is unique to the enlightened, though hedonically dissatisfied, Socrates Mill himself, however, seemed to assent elsewhere that hedonic pleasure was important to happiness too.
At the opposite extreme, Sigmund Freud seemed to take a purely hedonic view of happiness, more likely to favor our endeavor. Freud wrote, in response to his own question concerning what people demand of life and wish to achieve in it, the reply "The answer to this can hardly be in doubt.
They strive after happiness; they want to become happy and to remain so. This endeavor has two sides, a positive and a negative aim. It aims, on the one hand, at an absence of pain and displeasure, and, on the other, at the experiencing of strong feelings of pleasure" Freud p.
Freud's answer equates hedonic pleasure with happiness. According to this view, the more pleasure you have while avoiding displeasure , the happier you are.
Modern psychologists tend to fall in between these poles. Yet relatively few today would deny that hedonic pleasure is at least relevant to a final state of well-being. We do not pretend to see deeper into the nature of happiness than those thinkers of earlier times, but simply point again to the empirical convergence of hedonic and eudaimonic features together in most people who are actually happy.
And we note in conclusion, that so far as positive affect contributes to happiness, then at least some progress has been made in understanding the neurobiology of pleasure in ways that might be relevant.
In finishing, we can imagine several possibilities to relate happiness to particular hedonic psychological processes discussed above. Thus, one way to conceive of hedonic happiness is as 'liking' without 'wanting. That is, a state of pleasure without disruptive desires, a state of contentment Kringelbach and Berridge A different possibility is that moderate 'wanting', matched to positive 'liking', facilitates engagement with the world.
A little incentive salience may add zest to the perception of life and perhaps even promote the construction of meaning, just as in some patients therapeutic deep brain stimulation may help lift the veil of depression by making life events more appealing. However, too much 'wanting' can readily spiral into maladaptive patterns such as addiction, and is a direct route to great unhappiness.
Finally, all might agree that happiness springs not from any single component but from the interplay of higher pleasures, positive appraisals of life meaning and social connectedness, all combined and merged by interaction between the brain's default networks and pleasure networks. Achieving the right hedonic balance in such ways may be key to the brain's generation of positive well-being.
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A broader definition of SRP includes the coordination of various basic emotional processes and bodily interoceptive stimuli e. Interestingly, a recent study demonstrated that SRP also induces neural activity in the same regions that are recruited by various rewards. This underlines that both reward processes and self-relatedness might share a similar evaluative process de Greck et al.
SCMS and their networks e. Some authors in the fields of psychoanalysis and biology have claimed that other proactive motivations that are independent of libido can be observed in human beings and in animals. One of these is no doubt attachment, today considered a primary motivation, biologically innate, which makes any attempt to explain it as a secondary element, with respect to the gratification of drives, awkward Pine, To this regard, it must be noted that Freud elaborated two different theories of pleasure: a quantitative one, founded on the model of discharge-reduction of the drive tension, and a qualitative one, its model a type of sensual pleasure linked to child sexuality which is not easy to conceptualize in the terms set out by the principle of constancy Eagle, Later, the pioneering observation by Bowlby and, in a second moment, the review of literature on infancy by Stern , made it clear once and for all that objectual attachment is present in human beings, in such an evident and precocious manner that it is possible to consider it in all respects as a primary and autonomous motivation.
Again, according to Stern , the pleasure in children that can be observed during transitions characterized by secure attachment seems to be associated with moderate stimulation and therefore excitement , rather than by a decrease or disappearance of excitement. The work carried out by some authors in the field of neuroscience has allowed to identify with a higher degree of clarity the neural systems involved in attachment relationships in human beings and animals.
One of the core motivational and emotional systems identified by Jaak Panksepp is CARE Panksepp and Biven, , which, other than being responsible for the promotion of attachment relationships, is also responsible for the creation of social bonds in a broader sense. Phylogenetically, this system could have evolved starting from other regions responsible for sexual desire and would thus share a certain neuroregulation with the latter.
From a neurochemical point of view, in fact, the high levels of oxytocin and endogenous opioids that can be observed in mothers caring for their offspring, could explain why the experience of caring for newborns is so gratifying for many mothers Panksepp and Biven, Accordingly, endogenous opioid activity seems to play a role not only at the level of the tegmental dopaminergic mesolimbic system, promoting appetitive and approach behaviors toward the maternal object, but it also seems to play a role in the physiological development of the orbitofrontal system, a region characterized by a high density of endogenous opioids that is responsible for maintaining attachment patterns, beyond being responsible for the subsequent ability in affect regulation.
Psychobiological attunement, interactive resonance, and the mutual synchronization and entrainment of physiological rhythms are fundamental processes that mediate attachment bond formation. Over the course of the first year after birth, limbic circuitries emerge in a sequential progression, from amygdala to anterior cingulate, to insula and, finally, to orbitofrontal cortex.
As a result of attachment experiences, orbitofrontal cortex enters a critical period of maturation in the last quarter of the first year, the same time that working models of attachment are first measured Schore, The orbital cortex matures in the middle of the second year, gradually allowing for an internal sense of security and self-regulation, which ultimately lead to the ability to regulate flexibly emotional states through interactions with other humans Schore, The emergence of these flexible predictive capacities are dependent on extended parental investment and caring, through which the child becomes less rigidly controlled by the environment and more in tune with possibilities for action and gratification.
It has been suggested that individual differences in the security of attachment and their sequelae can be viewed as reflecting, in part, variations in perceptions of personal agency among infants and toddlers Ford and Thompson, Besides, various forms of attachment pathologies specifically represent inefficient patterns of organization of the right brain, especially the right orbitofrontal areas Schore, , What has been discussed concerns, on the one hand, the complexity and, conversely, the risk of reductionism that connote the concept of pleasure, and on the other, the neurobiological substratum that supports the view of such complexity.
Pleasure is not the mere absence of tension, a return to the central fluctuating state prescribed by homoeostasis: on the contrary, the use of substances and consequent addiction suggest that an allostatic model is better at predicting relapses and that the desire of a reward accompanies behaviors of sensation or novelty seeking Pettorruso et al.
What we have attempted to do, by necessarily restricting the field of research, is to describe the neural structures and neurochemical systems involved in the functioning of pleasure, without giving into the paradigm of simple localizationism.
The advancement of neuroscientific knowledge actually allows to explain plurisemantic and sometimes paradoxical phenomena linked to pleasure and to the search of pleasure. However, it is appropriate to ask whether the level of knowledge so far achieved is enough to speak of interaction, mutual influence, however, promising it may be, correspondences, or even of proper integrations.
Indeed, integration presupposes that two subjects, which are irreducible one to the other at a structural level, share or render compatible parts or functions of themselves. What parts or functions can psychoanalysis and neuroscience share? The issue forms the backdrop, as it were, or a challenge, for the emerging dialog. The experience of pleasure, also beyond its limits and in the complexity of its interrelations, represents a useful and interesting testing site to attempt to integrate neuroscience and psychoanalysis.
The change in psychobiological functioning that it entails, also in the long term, by means of the processes of learning and memory, evidently occurs as an only phenomenon that the insufficient instruments our knowledge depends on translates into two different and parallel orders of events, one that can be ascribed to the body or the brain , the other to the mind.
To leave the Cartesian dualism behind is the fundamental and ideal objective of this work in progress. LJ contributed to article writing and personally revised and approved the final version of the manuscript.
All authors revised and approved the final version of the manuscript. The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest. The authors would like to thank Prof. Filippo Maria Ferro for his precious theoretical suggestions in the preparation of the manuscript. Alcaro, A. The affective core of the self: a neuro-archetypical perspective on the foundations of human and Animal subjectivity.
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Trends Cogn. Gallese, V. The bodily self as power for action. The most thorough historical account to date in English. Gardner, Eliot L. Gazzaniga, Michael ed. References to recent philosophical literature on these controversial questions are provided. Glare, P. Good on etymology, too. Gosling, J. The best introductory book on pleasure, too. Uncluttered and engagingly written, but with only a short select bibliography by way of references.
The aim is to distinguish disparate uses and claims run together in the hedonist tradition, without denying the existence or importance of occurrent positive affect in our emotional or active lives. Distinctions made in the course of the twentieth century reaction against hedonism are used to dissect hedonist claims and arguments while excesses of the ordinary language literature mentioned especially toward the end of n.
A work for undergraduates that wears its wisdom and scholarship lightly while attentive to the intuitive sources and motivations of hedonism in human life. Thorough and scholarly, but sometimes the interpretations are controversial.
Gusnard, Debra A. Haber, Suzanne N. Fudge, and Nikolaus R. Claims there are distinct moral emotions reflected to differing extents in different enculturated moralities. Matilal , Delhi: Oxford University Press, pp. Harkins, Jean and Anna Wierzbicka eds.
Heilman, Kenneth M. Hejmadi, Ahalya, Richard J. Psychological Science , 11 3 : — Suggests there are a plurality of basic positive affects. Requires corroboration by other methods, if additions are to be regarded as affects and as basic, rather than just as social signals; e. Heller, Wendy; Koven, Nancy S. Helm, Bennett W. Wood, T. Scott-Craig, and Bernard Gert, trans. Contains translation of De Homine , chs. Hoebel, Bart; Rada, Pedro V.
Houk, James C. Hugdahl, Kenneth and Davidson, Richard J. Hundert, E. A review of Helm a. Isen, Alice. Snyder and Shane J. Ito, Tiffany A. Izard, Carroll E. More daring in its interpretations and evolutionary speculation than the literature written for scientists. Miller, Jr. Section II, Hedonism, discusses well some options for relating pleasure and desire. A program for getting from momentary self-reports to somethingmore.
Excellent and accessible. Contains contributions from psychologists and others representing different subfields and literatures, generally more accessible than papers written for specialists. Probably the best single place to start reading scientfic literature on the subject. Kahneman, Daniel and Amos Tversky eds.
Kahneman, Daniel, Wakker, Peter P. See especially, with pages in the Academy edition, referenced in the entry just below, in parentheses: p. Adding the last of these formally to the medieval Intellect and Will may be new with him, although eighteenth century predecessors, perhaps especially J. Sulzer, came very close Gardiner, Metcalf, and Beebe Center, , ch. The relevant passage is on p.
VII, pp. Katkov, G. The loving is itself part of the act of sensing at which it is directed. One suspects this may be all the reflexivity intended; Chisholm has a loving of a loving in his analysis, which seems a permissible, but not a mandatory, reading of other Brentano texts.
Katz, Leonard D. An attempt to revive and reform pleasure-centered theorizing in both areas, in the spirit of the simple picture of pleasure. Includes discussion of the ancients, utilitarians, and of neuroscience through Some points are used and some improved upon or corrected here. Short commentary on Depue and Morrone-Strupinsky by a philosopher. VI, pp. Kirk, G. Kraye, Jill ed. Kringelbach, Morten. Kringelbach, Morten L. Berridge eds.
Nordgren eds. Lamme, Victor A. Lane, Richard D. Lane, Richard D, and Nadel, Lynn, eds. Larue, Gerald A. Many now take a less specific view of amygdala function. Liddell, Henry George and Robert Scott, rev.
Henry Stuart Jones, , 9th ed. Reports of the naive libertine hedonism of Yang Chu, apparently rare in extant ancient Chinese prose, are in chapter 7. Nidditch ed. II,xx and xxi are most relevant. Long, A. I containing English translations and Vol. II containing Greek texts. Lucretius Titus Lucretius Carus, 1st c. This exposition of Epicureanism in verse is available in many editions and translations. J: Humanities. Chapter 11 critically discusses Ryle a and b but overlooks the relevant chapter in his Madell, Geoffrey, , Philosophy, Music and Emotion.
There have been several identically paginated reprint editions. But see note on his above. Robson ed. Chapter XXV, pp. Mill, John Stuart, 1st ed. Many recent editions based on this are available. Chapter 6, pp. An indicator of change for the better account of pleasure. This standard is available in both British and Indian reprints. Moore, George Edward G. Moore uses an undifferentiated concept of consciousness. A controversial inference that pleasure cannot be the sort of thing that could be directly caused by drug action is drawn.
Morillo, Carolyn R. Material from this is included in her Includes material from her and in Chapter 2. Defends a hedonistic view of motivation and value but an avowedly nonnormative and naturalist one in the light of the brain reward and conditioning literature.
Murphy, Sheila T. Monahan and R. A uniform corrected edition appeared in , a 2d ed. Especially pp. Nussbaum, Martha C. Ockham, see William of Ockham. Onions, C. Owen, G. Haviland-Jones eds. Classic critical discussion of Ryle, accepting his positive account of enjoyment as a form of effortless attention but rejecting his claim that this is always a disposition rather than an episode. Perry, David L. Uses the method of British ordinary language philosophy but often takes issue with predecessors in it, as well as with the earlier hedonist tradition.
Pizzagalli, Diego; Shackman, Alexander J. Plato, , Complete Works , trans. Cooper ed. Hutchinson assoc ed. Plato, Definitions. Generally regarded as not by Plato himself, but a record of work done by those in his circle. It is included in the Complete Works in a translation by D. Plato, Gorgias , in Plato Plato, Philebus , trans. Gosling, London: Oxford University Press, A large and ongoing secondary literature debating the interpretation of the section on false pleasures exists.
Taylor, Oxford: Oxford University Press, rev. A large and continuing secondary literature exists on the interpretation of this latter section of the dialogue and on whether and how it can be reconciled with view defended inj other dialogues. Plato, Republic , in Plato Potter, Karl ed. Preston, Stephanie D. Six: Kinetic and Katastematic Pleasure, pp.
Provine, Robert J. Radhakrishnan, Sarvepalli and Moore, Charles A. Rawls, John, , A Theory of Justice , 2nd ed. Rhys Davids, T. There are also other reprint edition, British and Indian, of this old standard; a new dictionary in progress has not yet reached the terms of most interest here.
Rilling, James K. Gutman, Thorsten R. Zeh, Giuseppe Pagnoni, Gregory S. Berns, and Clinton D. Robinson, Terry E. Probably their most explicit and interesting to philosophers; a useful Glosssary clearly explains both the standard uses of relevant terms in their field and their innovations, pp.
A shorter version of their Rolls, Edmund T. This book is not really about emotion, as conceived by philosophers or in ordinary language, but mainly about brain systems for reward what an animal can be trained to perform an operant task in order to get and motivation, thoroughly reviewed by a senior experimenter on the brains of nonhuman animals — roughly, in older psychological jargon, the territory of reinforcement and drive.
Chapter 9 is on pleasure. Rosenkranz, Melissa A. Jackson, Kim M. Dalton, Isa Dolski, Carol D. Ryff, Burt H. Singer, Daniel Muller, Ned H.
Kalin, and Richard J. Ostensibly written as a self-help book free of deep philosophy, it is still worth reading, not only for its wise practical advice, nonetheless. Russell, James A. A sophisticated attempt to show how apparently competing approaches to the classification of emotion, the dimensional approach to which Russell is a major contributor and the discrete emotions approach supported, for example, by Ekman and Panksepp, can fit together.
Often in an assertive rhetorical tone. His largest collection of considerations against the view that pleasure is an occurrence in experience, mainly at pp. Some strong claims taken by followers to be obvious and based on ordinary English usage may, perhaps, be traced to other sources. That pleasure is inseparable from its object p. The very strongly hedged claim, that pleasure is not an episode since it cannot be independently clocked and one cannot be pleased quickly pp.
The relevant Aristotelian view is that pleasure is not a process but an activity that, like seeing, is complete in each of its experiential? It is strongly reminiscent of Aristotle. Scanlon, T. Scherer, Klaus R. The classic statement of the motivation by pleasant thoughts variety of hedonist motivation psychology is in Ch.
Leading scientists review the literature on how dopamine neurons serve as teachers or critics in learning and also show this function is not unique to dopamine neurons but is widespread. The revised edition contains no updating of the old science. Kahneman , pp. An Aristotelian-type view of well-being is deployed to produce a measure of social distributive justice. Seneca, Lucius Annaeus, —25 1st century B. Gummere, 3 vols. Shackman, Alexander J. Original publication: New York: Scribner, Sidgwick, Henry, , Methods of Ethics , 7th ed.
The culminating work of the British hedonistic utilitarian tradition and one of the all-time greats of moral philosophy. Book I, ch. Raphael and A. Macfie, eds. Smart, J. Criticism of Katz and Kagan from a desire-based standpoint on both pleasure and reasons. Solomon, Robert C. While many of their complaints about failures to distinguish different psychological and evaluative distinctions in the softer psychological literature and about the misleading terminology seeming to presuppose these are opposite poles or contraries are well-placed, the seeming rejection of the centrality of a single distinction between positive and negative affect in the affective sciences is at least very premature.
The harder evidence supporting it e. While Sorabji emphasizes the important ancient debate provoked by the claim of Chrysippus that emotions including pleasure and joy are judgments, there is some discussion of recent philosophical and scientific literature as well.
Cited passages in Vol. I, , pp. Provides an entry into the social psychology self-report literature, some of which deals with pleasure. Strick, Peter L. Sumner, L. Sutton, Steven K. Taylor, C. Thayer, Robert E. Tomkins, Silvan S.
Tracy, Jessica L. The most substantial contribution of the ordinary language tradition to the study of affect. An excellent, underread book, perhaps still the best philosophical discussion of the dissociation of emotional reactions from sensory pain, which neurologists and some philosophers became saliently aware of in result of reactions to battlefield injury and evacuation in World War I.
What he says about pain seems mainly to be consistent with science to date. Urry, Heather L. Concise account of the Epicureans and Stoics, too. Vasubandhu c. Buddhist , — A less satisfactory translation into English from this French translation, itself based mainly on an ancient Chinese translation from the original Sanskrit which has since been largely recovered, is that of L.
Has relevant recent references. Supports the dopamine pleasure interpretation. Walther von der Vogelweide, c.
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